Implications for Delivery
Different players in the safety chain will have different options open to them for the implementation of safety. A fleet operator or even a local authority cannot act alone to change internationally harmonised regulations, though they can lobby Governments for those changes. Governments cannot mandate exactly what vehicles fleets buy, though they can nudge those fleets in the directions they wish with information, advice, and price incentives.
Left to the free market alone, safety can often be seen only as a cost or inconvenience. This often translates to a perception that ‘voluntary’ action is ineffective, and the only solution is to regulate. This is not the case. Done well, implementing safety interventions without regulation can, in fact, be much faster and more effective, if it can align safety and profit goals for the companies involved (or align safety and personal aspirations and goals for private buyers).
The publication of consumer information about safety in clear, simple, 5-star ratings has proven extremely effective at making ‘safety sell’ for car makers. For private sales, the information alone may be enough. In commercial fleet situations, “the power of purchasing” can also be invaluable. If those contractual safety requirements are harmonised among a trade sector, a region, nationally, or better yet internationally, and enough organisations do it, then the buying power becomes enormous.
Where market action is successful, the role of regulation typically becomes a lagging one, ensuring the bottom end of a market does not fall too far behind the top and reaches at least a minimum standard. At this point, technologies are already available in a large part of the market and there is a lot of real-world experience so the regulatory process is much easier.
Despite the potential of market interventions, there will always be situations where it isn’t possible, or its not considered effective, or where regulation and market interventions can best work together. Here, regulation is more leading and may be required at a time when there is less experience in the market.
Whether implementing in the market directly or in regulation, the earlier in a technology life cycle that you want to introduce a measure, the more technically difficult it is to ensure it is the right approach. This is because there is less experience in the market. In extreme cases, some measures to encourage a system, are developed before any manufacturer has a production version. The risk of unintended consequences in these circumstances is quite high, so the implementation method needs to be sufficiently flexible to quickly amend the approach if problems occur. This can be easier if it is a company defining their own vehicle purchasing specifications, than it might be for an international regulation. However, it is critically important that any intervention on vehicle safety isn’t ‘fit and forget’; it’s important that its part of a continuous review and improvement process.
Background
Vehicle safety improvements can be implemented in many ways, each with advantages and disadvantages. The most suitable methods may also vary by type of safety improvement intended. Possible implementation methods include:
Improvements to vehicle design and construction
New Vehicle Approval Regulations
Consumer information schemes
The ‘Power of Purchasing’: contractual specifications & standards
Retrofitting improvements to existing vehicles (mandatory or voluntary)
Access restrictions, safety zones, safety pricing
Improvements to vehicle operation & use
Operator licensing regulations
Traffic regulations
Annual Inspect and roadworthiness checks
Compliance and enforcement
Regulations are undoubtedly the most powerful tool in the box; they are the only means of implementing improvements that can close to guarantee that the change will be implemented on all vehicles from a given date. However, regulation is also a blunt instrument. It is often applied across all vehicles of a given type, usually at least nationally, often internationally. Regulation is also binary: companies that can’t comply, can’t do their job. So, the content of regulation is usually a hard-fought compromise between all the stakeholders involved. It is usually a minimum standard, eliminating the worst performers from the market.
In the UK, we implement free market economics. It can be useful to think of road casualties in this context as a ‘market failure’: the profit motive has failed to provide the outcome that society wants. Correcting market failures is one of the primary purposes of Regulation. However, it is also possible for a range of non-regulatory measures to be introduced, and these help engineer the market itself to correct the failure. If ‘safety sells’ then the profit motive can drive improvement far faster, and often further, than Regulation does.
This is the aim of a range of interventions including consumer information; industry best practice schemes; access restrictions; and pricing models. The best-known examples are the various New Car Assessment Programmes (NCAPs) around the world, Euro NCAP being our version in the UK. Global NCAP refers to this as the regulatory push to improve the minimum standard, and the NCAP pull to encourage the market from minimum standard to best practice. In the UK, the Transport for London (TfL) Bus Safety Standard is an excellent example of a purchasing standard. TfL’s Direct Vision Standard is used both as a purchasing standard and also as the world’s first ‘safety zone’: a local access restriction based only on safety criteria.
What the Research Shows
Most vehicle safety interventions are accompanied by predictions of their effect on road casualties at the time they are implemented. However, the effectiveness of regulation is rarely comprehensively and rigorously assessed afterwards.
The effectiveness of EuroNCAP has been reviewed periodically. For example, a 2019 study led by Chalmers University and Swedish insurers found that when five-star cars were compared with two-star cars, the proportion of serious injuries was 34% lower.
One reason reviews of regulation changes are relatively rare could be the timescales involved. For example, it has been predicted that the new General Safety Regulation (GSR2) will prevent more than 25,000 deaths and serious injuries in the European Union. While the text of that regulation was agreed in 2019, the implementation dates when new technologies are mandatory for all new vehicles are staged from 2024 to 2029. The more demanding technologies won’t become mandatory until towards the end of the implementation period, but the review of the effectiveness and negotiation of any changes to the regulation started in 2025 (one year after the first new technologies became mandatory on all new vehicles).
Regulation vs market intervention
It is hard to use casualty data to compare the methods of implementation. Instead, fitment of the safety features can be used, such as for Advanced Emergency Braking (AEB). In both passenger cars and HGVs, the very first introduction of the technology was around 2006 but the evolution from there was very different. Implementation in HGVs followed the regulatory path, and cars followed the consumer information path. How each evolved is described below:
HGVs: Mercedes introduced AEB in 2006. The EU made it mandatory from 2015 but until very close to that date, no other manufacturer offered the technology. From 2015, all new vehicles were equipped, with some exemptions (fitment very high). Around 2017, Mercedes introduced a version that was capable of reacting to pedestrians crossing ahead of the vehicle. In 2021, they added a version capable of braking in a nearside turn when a cyclist was present. However, in 2023, fitment of these new pedestrian and cyclist AEB technologies was confined only to Mercedes; no other manufacturer offered them. In 2024, Euro NCAP began to assess trucks. In their first tests, they found that all but one manufacturer of vehicles for sale in 2025 would offer AEB for pedestrians and cyclists.
Cars: Honda were the first to market in 2006 and by 2012, Volvo had introduced a pedestrian function. Euro NCAP began to require systems for front to rear AEB in 2014, for pedestrians in 2016, and cyclists in 2018. Fitment of these technologies was standard on most models by 2019, six years ahead of most of the HGV market. No regulation was necessary to achieve this. AEB pedestrian and cyclist will become mandatory in the EU for cars in 2026. This is to force the small part of the market that does not already fit the technology to do so.
It is clear from both paths that, left alone with no intervention, the vehicle market will innovate and invent new safety systems, but it will be slow to adopt them at scale. The comparison illustrates a passenger car market where ‘safety sells’ and the current status of AEB includes many more functions than is available for trucks, despite a lack of regulation. By contrast, the truck market has been driven only by regulation and this has been less effective at scaling new technologies and creating continuous innovation.
Market interventions can be more effective than regulatory options, but they must be carefully applied.
While interventions about how vehicles are licensed and used can often be applied to everybody all at once, that is much more difficult to achieve with interventions related to the design and construction of vehicles. Both type approval regulation and Euro NCAP are applied only to new vehicles. New vehicle technologies can be technically difficult to fit to existing vehicles and Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) have traditionally rarely offered new developments on existing vehicles. A retrofit aftermarket supply chain has emerged in some areas, particularly around vision and warning systems. These have lower development budgets and difficulty integrating with existing vehicle systems. A review by Loughborough University of aftermarket systems fitted in response to TfL’s HGV Safety Permit (2020) requirements found substantial performance and driver acceptance issues. Upgraded requirements were implemented as a result. Exceptions do, of course, exist; aftermarket fatigue detection devices have been found to be very effective by some bus and truck fleets.
Local access restrictions
Local access restrictions based on vehicle performance can also be very powerful. Low emission zones have existed for many years and have been demonstrated to be effective. However, they can also be very controversial. TfL’s HGV safety permit is the first local access restriction based only on safety criteria and follows a similar pattern. One of the main concerns is that it relates to vehicle safety performance but is applied to all vehicles regardless of age or function. Additionally, the low emissions zones allow all vehicles in, they just charge a fee (currently £12.50) for non-compliant vehicles. However, in the HGV safety permit, non-compliant vehicles are illegal and subject to a fine for non-compliance (£550).
Direct vision performance is linked to vehicle design and some vehicles are better than others. It is also strongly linked to operational characteristics such as the need for powerful engines in long haul, or additional ground clearance for construction trucks also operating off road. Operators who had bought a legal vehicle to deliver in London were forced either to buy a new vehicle before the old one had completed its expected service life, or to invest in aftermarket technology. The Safety Permit system was upgraded 4 years later and operators that had invested in aftermarket technology, would have to remove that and throw it away, to replace it with higher specification versions.
The cost of the Safety Permit scheme is the main source of the controversy because it is very expensive and a major departure from usual vehicle safety policy. However, it is also disrupting to logistics, particularly for operators who may not regularly come into London or even come from overseas. If similar schemes were to be implemented elsewhere, a common technical standard would be critically important. It would be extremely difficult for the freight industry to function effectively if every major area they enter has different vehicle requirements.
Pricing incentives or penalties can potentially be applied at a number of levels. Governments already do this in terms of fuel duty, road tax (all vehicles), and the benefit in kind tax for company cars. In general, these mechanisms have all been used to influence emissions. Similarly, road pricing (tolls) has long had elements of infrastructure wear in their pricing, and can also now include emissions. However, so far, these pricing mechanisms have not been applied to safety.
Proving the effectiveness of a local initiative is also substantially harder because of low casualty numbers. TfL claim publicly that collisions involving HGVs in London were, in 2023, 62% lower than the 2017-2019 baseline average from before the introduction of the HGV Safety Permit scheme. However, the casualty data shows much of this reduction was seen between 2017 and 2019, before the scheme was first enforced (late 2020), and was seen across all HGV types, even small HGVs not covered by the scheme.
A huge number of other factors (e.g. levels of cycling, quality of cycle infrastructure, levels of other traffic, covid traffic changes, the amount of construction in London etc) could also influence these figures. Therefore, attributing the change in casualty numbers to the Direct Vision Standard scheme is challenging. It is also critical to the justification of the existing changes and any future developments of the scheme.
Retrofit technologies & updates
In the past, retrofit technologies have often been found to be less effective than solutions fitted by the OEM, as well as being more expensive to install and controversial when forced upon people. However, technology is beginning to change this. Many new vehicles can now do ‘over the air’ updates. This brings the ability to add high quality new safety functions part way through a vehicle’s life, as long as the necessary hardware is on the vehicle. There are now numerous examples of new or improved safety functions being added to existing vehicles, which allows a much quicker impact compared to introducing changes only on new vehicles. However, it is also a major challenge to regulators, because, in theory, performance could also be taken away. Traditionally, in-service roadworthiness tests have relied on simple assessments of safety systems (e.g., no warning lights illuminated) to show they are still working. For example, in theory, a manufacturer could produce a cheap lane keeping system that passes the track tests required by test authorities, but proves to be incredibly annoying to its drivers when entering service. There would be nothing to stop the company then updating the system over the air to reduce customer complaints in a way that also reduces safety performance. The software version control is becoming increasingly important, along with cyber security.
Implementing vehicle use interventions
The above discussion is mainly applicable to interventions aiming to control features in the construction of vehicles. As highlighted at the start, there are also interventions that affect the use of vehicles. The arguments around voluntary measures and regulations relating to use are more varied depending on exactly what is changed. Much of the safety of vehicles ‘in use’ actually relates to the behaviour of drivers, and in the case of fleets, the companies that employ them. These areas are discussed in The Role for Business, under Safe Road Use.
However, there are areas (particularly around the roadworthiness and potentially the loading of vehicles) that can be considered under the vehicle component. Traditionally, nearly all interventions in this area are regulatory. Usually these are designed to ‘punish’ bad behaviour with fines. However, it is always important to ensure these target the people best positioned to prevent future offences. For private passenger cars, that is usually the driver. However, in commercial operations it may be different. If vehicle overloading is taken as an example, then in the UK, the driver of an overloaded vehicle can be fined and get points on their license. In addition to this, the company responsible for operating the vehicle can be fined very significant amounts for the same offence (hundreds of thousands in some cases). However, the commercial reality in a very competitive haulage market is that the main beneficiary of overloading is often the shipper of the goods, who has contracted a cheaper movement of their goods because they have chosen an operator who enables that low price through overloading. In Australia, a ‘chain of responsibility’ law was introduced to extend liability in these cases to the shipper of goods (or even the receiver of goods).
Positive incentives can also be a valid consideration here, rather than only negative punishments. In the UK, there are strict rules about the roadworthiness of vehicles and these are enforced through the annual MOT for most vehicles but also in roadside inspections. For private cars, these are ad-hoc by the police. For commercial vehicles, they are undertaken by the DVSA in systematic roadside campaigns and additionally with inspections at operators’ premises. These are usually targeted on vehicles which are more likely to be non-compliant to ensure that DVSA uses its resources effectively to remove as many vehicles with poor roadworthiness from the road. As such, findings can often be that more than 50% of vehicles stopped were defective. However, a side effect of the effective targeting is, of course, that this cannot be considered a statistic representative of the fleet as a whole (which would require random checks). These checks can be significantly disruptive to fleet operations and operators with good compliance records would be unhappy with this. As such, an Operators Compliance & Risk score was devised that rated the compliance of companies based on their record and they would be inspected less. This was then extended into the ‘Earned Recognition scheme’, which meant that operators with good compliance history and management systems can self-report maintenance data (subject to audit) and further reduce the chances of disruptive enforcement activity, providing a reward for good behaviour.
As such, elements of the market-led approach, now common in the implementation of vehicle design and construction interventions, can also be applied for interventions on the use of vehicles (though perhaps more effectively in a business fleet context).
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Global NCAP. (2025). FleetSafe Guide 2025–2026: Recommendations for safer fleet vehicle selection. Global NCAP. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5fb4ea8933ae6c208c3dac41/t/680f3ec28818383eaba44afa/1745829587014/fleet+guide+2025+-+2026+-+online.pdf
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National Heavy Vehicle Regulator. (n.d.). Chain of responsibility. https://www.nhvr.gov.au/safety-accreditation-compliance/chain-of-responsibility
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With thanks to Apollo Vehicle Safety for their contribution to this content.
